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Abstract: The ideal of the rule of law speaks differently to law-makers and law-appliers. The 
judge, being the legal official tasked with the application of law by the court, is not in the law-
maker’s position of choosing what, legally, ought to obtain, but rather is tasked with furthering, 
by administering, what, legally, already obtains. This demarcation of responsibilities rests on 
the ability of the law-maker to settle authoritatively moral-political questions in such a way as 
to render possible the artificial techne of legal reasoning. Bills of rights are unusual law-making 
acts insofar as they deliberately fail to settle moral-political questions under law by declining to 
specify the general right ‘P has the right to x’. How, then, have judges sought to satisfy their 
law-applying role in relation to disputed claims of rights? The approach shared by judges in 
Europe and much of the Commonwealth is to interpret the open-ended rights of bills of rights 
to include nearly all possible instances of conduct that could be related to the right, with the 
consequence that nearly all legislation, including legislative specifications of open-ended rights, 
could be held to infringe the bill of rights. In turn, the legality of legislation turns on judicially-
created standards of proportionality and balancing, which lack the discipline afforded by 
technical legal reasoning. As a consequence, judges have assumed the function of law-makers, 
with all of the associated challenges to the rule of law when law-applying institutions make law 
in the very moment the legal subject is before them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* This essay is forthcoming in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (Wellington: Lexis 
Nexis, 2011). For discussions and comments, I am grateful to Richard Ekins, Stéphanie Vig, Paul Yowell, 
and participants at the Proportionality in Human Rights Law colloquium hosted at the University of Western 
Ontario (November 2010). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The various desiderata of the rule of law speak differently to law-making and law-
applying institutions and officials. To the actors responsible for making law, the 
rule of law aspires that they approach their task with a concern for the form of 
legal rules, namely that legal rules be promulgated, clear, and prospective, that each 
new rule be made to cohere with the existing set of legal rules, that rules not be 
(otherwise) impossible to comply with, and – with the understanding that legal 
systems subsist in time – that the rules adopted by the law-maker be stable over 
time.1 Fuller aptly captured the idea of desiderare as ‘a morality of aspiration and not 
of duty’ and by describing the various ends pursued by the rule of law as instances 
of ‘legal excellence’ in the making of legal rules.2 
This orientation to the ideal of ‘legal excellence’ allows one to appreciate why 
each desideratum of the rule of law is one of degree. Legal rules should be more or 
less stable over time, given that changing circumstances will invite the law-maker to 
revisit previously adopted and promulgated legal rules. Similarly, the clarity of legal 
rules will be mediated by the subject matter of legal regulation and the intended 
(expert or lay) addressees. Promulgation will be more or less achieved by publicising 
legal rules and making them available in libraries and, also, by making known to 
subjects whom they may call upon (legal officials and jurists) to assist them in 
determining what legal rules are of special concern to them. The overarching 
orientation, captured in one formulation or another by most students of the rule 
of law, is that of guidance for the legal subject – concern for the subject’s agency 
and capacity for self-direction, all of which contemplates the possibility of 
voluntary compliance without coercion (even if coercion will be necessary for 
some) in planning one’s and the community’s affairs. 
This orientation to the possibility of voluntary compliance does not render 
the rule of law uninterested in the work of law-applying institutions and officials. 
The law sets out an ideal against which to measure the real actions of subjects, 
who will fail in some, perhaps many, respects to satisfy that which law would have 
of them. In affirming, say, ‘It is an offence to [...]’ or ‘Anyone who [...] is guilty of 
an offence’, the law-maker ‘has in his mind’s eye the pattern of a future social 
order, or of some aspect of such an order, and is attempting to reproduce that 
order’.3 This pattern guides the law-maker in choosing the range of legal 
regulations in all fields of legal order. Throughout, the law articulates a standard of 
excellence in human affairs just as the rule of law sets out a standard of excellence 
in the design and implementation of legal affairs. Yet, in light of our fallibility in 
                                                     
1 See generally L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev ed, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), ch II; J. 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 270-276; J. Raz ‘The Rule of Law 
and its Virtue’ in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
2 Fuller, ibid, 41, 43. John Finnis captures the thought by referring to the rule of law as ‘the name 
commonly given to the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape’: ibid, 270. 
3 Finnis, ibid, 282. 
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human affairs, the rule of law concerns itself with promoting compliance where 
voluntary efforts at compliance have failed (by error, inattention, or with intent). 
In this way, law-applying institutions and officials participate in helping to match, 
so far as possible, the ideal to the real; that is, to reproduce here and now the 
pattern of a future social order.4 
The desiderata pertaining to the administration of legal rules echo the 
concern to provide the legal subject with guidance. Although the specifications of 
good administration are multiple and include judicial review of administrative 
action and the independence of the judiciary, legal excellence in administration 
relates primarily to the desideratum that rulings and decisions applicable to legal 
subjects be guided by rules complying with the first set of desiderata (the form of 
rules designed by law-makers) and that legal officials charged with the 
responsibility to administer the legal rules actually do so and do so consistently. 
The concern of the rule of law for the administration of legal rules is to maintain 
the guidance afforded by the law-maker to the legal subject at the point where the 
legal subject interacts with the legal official. The officials charged with the 
administration of the law should not act in a way that undermines the law-maker’s 
craft.5 To do so would not only frustrate the law-maker’s ability to pursue the 
pattern of a future social order, but more fundamentally would upset the legal 
subject who, concerned to plan affairs and design a life-plan, would be frustrated 
at the very moment the law is authoritatively applied to those affairs and that life 
plan. Should law’s administration proceed without concern for law – should justice 
be done not according to law, but according to the judge’s best view of what justice 
requires – the legal official tasked with applying the law may be said to be acting 
upon rather than guiding the legal subject. 
That the desiderata of the rule of law speak differently to law-making and 
law-applying institutions is captured, albeit in a different way, by the artificiality of 
legal reasoning. Legal reasoning rests on a distinction between the deliberative 
process leading to the decision to adopt (or not) this legal rule (rather than another 
or any at all) and the enactment and subsequent application by a law-making 
official or institution of that legal rule. The deliberative process is marked by its 
‘diversity and adversarial character’ – it explores and proceeds in the circumstances 
of politics confronting reasonable disagreement with respect to whether the 
proposed enactment should be pursued or how or if it should be modified. By 
contrast, the enactment of the legal rule appeals to ‘determinacy and univocality’ in 
settling what should now prevail, until the law-maker revisits the issue.6 Although 
the real and the ideal fail to meet too often in this respect, the rule of law 
contemplates that the contingency and tentativeness animating debates preceding 
                                                     
4 It bears mention that law-applying institutions and officials are themselves legal subjects, and their 
conformity with law is also required to realise the rule of law. 
5 At times, this commitment may require undermining the law-maker’s immediate work so as to maintain 
the overarching commitment to the rule of law, including by ‘going beyond the formulae of intersecting 
or conflicting rules [so as] to establish particular and if need be novel reconciliations’: Finnis, n 1 above, 
271. 
6 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 40. 
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the enactment of a legal rule should be absent once the rule is adopted and legal 
subjects and officials seek to be guided by it. Stated otherwise: the rule of law 
contemplates a transition from the open moral-political reasoning that informs the 
decision about what a legal rule shall be to the legal reasoning that informs the 
official application of the chosen legal rule to those to whom it is addressed. 
The artificial techne of law and legal reasoning guides the legal subject not only 
when the latter makes plans, but also when the subject confronts a legal official. 
Now before a legal official – either because the official is required to act on a 
request by the legal subject or because the legal subject is suspected of having run 
afoul of a legal rule – the subject looks to the official as an officer of the law. In 
this capacity, the techne of law and legal reasoning turns on nothing short of ‘the 
principle – a principle of fairness – that litigants (and others involved in the 
process) should be treated by judges (and others with power to decide) impartially, 
in the sense that they are as nearly as possible to be treated by each judge as they 
would be treated by every other judge’.7 The judge, being the legal office-holder 
(official) tasked with the application of law by the court, is not in the law-maker’s 
position of choosing what, legally, ought to obtain, but rather is tasked with 
furthering, by administering, what, legally, already obtains.  
The capacity of legal officials to treat like cases alike, to act as would any 
other legal official, turns in large part on the acts of the law-maker. Fuller captures 
this idea, albeit in a related context, by stating how the ‘first and most obvious 
[route to disaster] lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be 
decided on an ad hoc basis’.8 The rule of law asks the law-maker to resolve in law 
moral-political debates alive in the community by employing the distinctive 
devices of law which rely on the artifice of legal-technical reasoning. In so doing, 
the law-maker allows the judge (and other legal officials) to rely on ‘law’s 
distinctive devices: defining terms, and specifying rules, with sufficient and 
necessarily artificial clarity and definiteness to establish the “bright lines” which 
make so many real-life questions easy questions [under law]’.9 This technical 
orientation to legal reasoning seeks no less than ‘to provide the citizen, the legal 
adviser, and the judge with an algorithm for deciding as many questions as 
possible – in principle every question – yes (or no), this course of action would (or 
would not) be lawful’.10  
Although the idea of reciprocity in rule of law thought is often focused on the 
relationship between law-maker and legal subject,11 a similar reciprocity extends to 
the relationship between law-maker and law-applying officials. The law-maker can 
be taken to say to the legal official: ‘Apply the law, no more and less, as set out in 
                                                     
7 J. Finnis ‘Natural Law and Legal Reasoning’ in R.P. George (ed), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 
(New York: Clarendon Press, 1992), 150. 
8 Fuller, n 1 above, 39. 
9 Finnis, n 7 above, 142. 
10 ibid, 142. See further Finnis, n 1 above, 276-281. 
11 See Fuller, n 1 above, 39-40. 
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formal enactments’, on the understanding that the legal official may expect of the 
law-maker: ‘Design your legal rules with sufficient precision such that, as guided 
by legal reasoning, I can proceed to act as would any other official in my position’. 
Taking the view that law and legal systems subsist in time, the reciprocity between 
law-maker and legal official is understood to develop over time, as each informs 
the task at hand according to the prevailing canons of legal interpretation 
(informed by and reacting to new legal terminology and unforeseen applications) 
that allow the ultimate end of guidance to the legal subject to be better pursued. 
Where the law-maker relies on law’s distinctive devices and seeks to establish 
the ‘bright lines’ that render otherwise difficult questions easy questions under law, 
the legal subject is guided by law and the legal official may comply with the legal 
excellence expected of the office of law’s administrator. However, where the law-
maker fails to establish bright lines, where law is adopted and promulgated in a 
way that fails to resolve life’s difficult moral-political questions as easy questions 
under law, the rule of law is challenged: the legal subject will be unable to rely on 
law for much guidance and, because the same lack of guidance will complicate the 
legal official’s task, the legal subject will be unable to predict just how the official 
will administer the law in the case implicating the subject. In this important 
respect, bills of rights challenge the rule of law.12 
 
 
 
LAW-MAKING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS 
 
With few exceptions, bills of rights are without bright lines. Amongst the variously 
worded guarantees ‘P has the right (or freedom) to x’ (where x is substituted for 
the concepts equality, liberty, life, conscience or the general act-descriptions 
speech, vote, assemble), one searches in vain for the sufficient and necessarily 
artificial clarity and definiteness contemplated by the techne of legal reasoning. 
Indeed, law-makers charged with the task of articulating the rights and freedoms 
of a bill of rights have generally avoided defining terms and specifying rules. Be it 
at the international, regional, or domestic (legislative or constitutional) levels, bills 
of rights have been proposed and adopted in such a way as to leave the 
relationship between rights and disputed claims of rights open and unresolved.13 A 
bill of rights is often proposed at the deliberative stage and adopted at the 
enactment stage in a manner that maintains near all of the tentativeness and 
contingency of moral-political questions surrounding rights. Indeed, this is 
captured, albeit obliquely, by the more or less common appeal to the lexicon of 
                                                     
12 A different perspective on this challenge is explored in J. Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Sovereignty and the 
Rule of Law’ in Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 68-78, who reviews how rights-based judicial review may frustrate the law’s predictability. 
13 The following draws on the more encompassing discussion in G.C.N. Webber, The Negotiable 
Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp 1-12 and 160-
173. 
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‘moral rights’ in legal scholarship and judgments relying on bills of rights.14 This 
rather inaccurate description of what are, in law, ‘legal rights’ (even if bills of rights 
are concerned to give legal form and expression to moral rights) captures how 
little work the law-maker has undertaken to specify which rights, amongst the 
variously plausible and reasonable specifications of ‘P has the right to x’, should 
obtain in law. 
 
MAINTAINING HARD QUESTIONS UNDER LAW 
 
Among the triumphant declarations of rights common to most bills of rights are 
the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; the rights to life, 
liberty, and security; and the rights to equality and to vote. Yet, the legal form 
given to these various rights and freedoms leaves unresolved the various contested 
claims of rights that many will contend and others will deny fall within the scope 
and content of the bill of rights. For example, the right to life is formulated in way 
that avoids providing definite legal answers to moral-political debates over 
euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, and assisted suicide; freedom of 
expression is formulated in a manner that offers no determinate legal answers to 
debates surrounding hate speech, pornography, and libel. And so it is with the 
various formulations of other rights, all of which (with few exceptions) avoid 
resolving in law disputes over the range of familiar contested claims of rights. 
Whilst it would be far too strong to suggest that bills of rights play no part in 
resolving these (and other) disputed claims of rights, it nevertheless remains the 
case that bills of rights bear on but do not resolve these contests. Legal subjects 
(and their counsel) and legal officials (including judges) looking to a bill of rights 
to resolve contested claims of rights cannot appeal to the familiar tools of the 
lawyer’s trade to provide answers of the certitude ‘yes (or no), this course of action 
would (or would not) be lawful’. The law-makers responsible for bills of rights 
have provided neither legal subjects nor legal officials with the tools to answer 
these questions. 
On bills of rights, law-makers have more or less unanimously preferred to 
proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement on grand formulations in a way 
that avoids the great debates (and disagreements) animating rights. Stated 
otherwise: law-makers have declined to render the difficult moral-political debates 
easy questions under law. To be sure, the resolution of rights-disputes is not 
avoided because these contests are unimportant or unforeseen or, in turn, because 
they are predicted to abate with time. It rather seems that bills of rights are 
proposed and adopted without being wholly worked out in large measure because 
rights-disputes are so persistent and their resolution so important. Whilst there is 
                                                     
14 This view is celebrated by R. Dworkin in ‘The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise’ in Freedom’s 
Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). But note that Dworkin also says: ‘Most cases at 
law—even most constitutional cases—are not hard cases. The ordinary craft of a judge dictates an answer 
and leaves no room for the play of personal moral conviction’ (ibid, 11). 
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widespread agreement on the right to x, there is widespread disagreement on what, 
precisely, this should be understood to mean (both in law and in political 
morality). These debates animating rights do not dissipate the moment a bill of 
rights is drafted and adopted, and so bills of rights are framed in a manner that 
does little to resolve, in law, moral-political disagreement, except to provide an 
additional (more or less legal) platform on which the disagreement may play out. 
In this way, law-makers have tended to frame and adopt bills of rights in a 
manner that leaves the legal resolution of rights-disputes to a later day. They do so, 
not on the hope that these disputes will not arise or require resolution, but 
precisely on the understanding that answers to these disputes will be required – 
contingent and contested answers in the circumstances of reasonable and 
persistent disagreement. Of course, law-makers confront contingent and contested 
answers in the circumstances of reasonable and persistent disagreement on a 
quotidian basis. How then are rights different? As we shall see, law-makers do not 
so much avoid resolving disputed claims of rights as avoid resolving them in bills of 
rights. But as a consequence, bills of rights provide little guidance to those seeking 
answers to the contested moral-political questions alive in the community, 
questions the resolution of which demarcates the scope and content of the 
guaranteed rights. 
Hence the query: where are bright lines to be found if not in a bill of rights? 
 
LEGISLATION AND THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, together with many other 
domestic and international bills of rights share the following in common: their 
law-makers saw fit to signal, explicitly, that the relationship between the bill of 
rights and contested claims of rights remained unresolved in law. They did so 
primarily by way of (one or more) limitation clauses.15 
Consider the following, familiar formulation of a limitation clause: ‘the rights 
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’.16 Different bills of rights appeal to slightly different 
formulations, at times appealing to the different range of ends that are candidates 
for justification in a free and democratic society (as do the various limitation 
clauses of the European Convention17) or informing the ‘factors’ that will inform 
the justification of a right’s limitation (as does the limitation clause of the South 
                                                     
15 An overview of different limitation clauses is undertaken in Webber, n 13 above, 59-65. Note that the 
law-makers of the first series of Amendments to the US Constitution did not explicitly signal the 
underdeterminacy of their work, but the underdeterminacy can nevertheless be taken ‘to speak’ for itself. 
Limitation clauses, in this respect, make the implied explicit. 
16 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. This formulation is inspired, in great measure, from s 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
17 These include morals, health, public order, public safety, and the rights and freedoms of others: 
European Convention, arts 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2). 
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African Bill of Rights18). Whilst limitation clauses have been described as ‘the 
statement of political conflict pretending to be a resolution of it’,19 they are better 
understood as statements, within a bill of rights, that the law-makers of the bill of 
rights have delegated to others the resolution of political conflict surrounding 
which among the possible moral and legal meanings of ‘P has the right to x’ will 
be favoured in law. In this way, the law-makers responsible for the bill of rights 
signal that this difficult work remains to be completed by subsequent law-
makers.20 
How do limitation clauses frame the work of subsequent law-makers 
concerned to complete the bill of rights project left open by the bill of rights 
itself? The overlapping formulations of limitation clauses all appeal to the 
concepts of limitation (‘limitation’, ‘restrictions, formalities, conditions, penalties’), 
justification (‘as can be demonstrably justified’, ‘justifiable’, ‘necessary’), free and 
democratic society (‘democratic society’, ‘free and democratic society’, ‘open and 
democratic society’), and prescribed by law (‘prescribed by law’, ‘provided by law’, ‘in 
accordance with law’). Whilst formulations differ in precision and formulation, the 
directive contemplated by a limitation clause is simple enough: subsequent law-
makers are instructed to specify in law the scope and content of the guarantee ‘P 
has the right to x’ so as to provide it with jural structure. In so doing, subsequent 
law-makers must satisfy themselves (and may be called upon to satisfy legal 
officials, especially judges) that the specification of each right is justifiable against 
the standard of a free and democratic society – a society that is free and 
democratic in part because the various rights and freedoms of the bill of rights 
have been specified and given effect in law. 
What is required of subsequent law-makers tasked by bills of rights to 
prescribe by law the limitation of the open-ended guarantees of rights and 
freedoms? Essentially, the task is none other than that which falls on the law-
maker in every other respect: to translate moral-political questions into easy 
questions in law by employing law’s distinctive devices that will allow legal subjects 
and officials to be guided by the law. In undertaking this task, the law-maker must 
be sensitive to the subject matter of legal regulation. On the topic of rights, not 
only is the law-maker tasked to resolve, in law, the open-ended moral-political 
debates animating rights, but the law-maker is equally tasked with translating the 
two-term stipulation ‘P has a right to x’ in a bill of rights into a qualified three-
term relationship in law. As Hohfeld reminded us long ago, legal rights may be 
understood as a relationship between two persons (P and Q) with respect to a 
                                                     
18 The factors include the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, and the 
nature and extent of the limitation: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 36(1). 
19 J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 14. 
20 I refer to ‘subsequent’ law-makers throughout to simplify the text. Of course, because legal systems 
subsist in time and a bill of rights is not introduced at time ‘naught’, the specification of rights left open 
by a bill of rights will in many cases be achieved both in subsequently and previously enacted legislation. 
  
Grégoire C. N. Webber                  Legal Reasoning and Bills of Rights 
 
 9
given activity (specific act-description) in some set of specified circumstances.21 
This determinate quality of legal rights is absent in the bill of rights’ affirmation 
that ‘P has a right to x’, which has ‘hundreds if not thousands of possible moral 
meanings’, relating to hundreds if not thousands of possible legal meanings.22 Selecting 
among these meanings is the task left to subsequent law-makers. 
Take, for example, the guarantee ‘Every citizen has the right to vote’. Among 
the moral meanings that the law-makers must adjudicate on are the disputed 
claims of minimum age qualifying one as eligible to vote, whether persons 
convicted of criminal activity should have their right suspended whilst imprisoned, 
how closely to conform to ‘one person, one vote’ in designing electoral districts, 
and so on. Whilst the bill of rights may avoid resolving these disputes, the legal 
system cannot and so law-makers are called upon to complete the task left open in 
the bill of rights. In so doing, law-makers not only resolve in law the moral-
political questions afflicting debates and disagreements animating rights, they also 
appeal to law’s distinctive devices to set out bright lines. To do so, they appeal to 
the following six features identified by Finnis as in need of specification: 
 
(a) the identity of the duty-holder(s) who must respect or give effect to [P]’s 
right; (b) the content of the duty, in terms of specific act-descriptions, 
including the times and other circumstances and conditions for the 
applicability of the duty; (c) the identity or class-description of [P], the 
correlative claim-right-holder(s) [...]; (d) the conditions under which a claim-
right-holder loses his claim-right, including the conditions (if any) under 
which he can waive the relevant duties; (e) the claim-rights, powers, and 
liberties of the claim-right-holder in the event of non-performance of duty; 
and, above all, (f) the liberties of the right-holder, including a specification of 
the limits of those liberties, i.e. a specification of his duties, especially of non-
interference with the liberties of other holders of that right or of other 
recognized rights.23 
 
These six features do not do all the work necessary to translate ‘P has the right to 
x’ into a series of specified rights with jural structure qua relationships between P 
and Q and specific act-descriptions. Nevertheless, they make clear the 
responsibilities of law-makers concerned to complete the bill of rights. 
As is well understood by students of human rights law even when it is not 
explicitly acknowledged, much of the work specifying the rights and freedoms of a 
bill of rights is found in legislation. Legislation gives these rights life in law by 
setting out various modes of legal regulation (criminal sanctions, civil guarantees, 
licensing schemes), the protected or forbidden or regulated instances of engaging in 
specific act-descriptions (when and where one may speak, when and where one 
                                                     
21 See W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1919).  
22 J. Finnis, ‘Some Professorial Fallacies About Rights’ (1972) 4 Adelaide Law Review 377, 385-386.  
23 Finnis, n 1 above, 218-219. 
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may cast one and only one ballot), the time, place and manner for such activity (of 
protests and marches during rush hour, of reasonable assault in self-defence), and 
so on. Through various enactments in criminal law, contract law, tort law, and 
other fields of overlapping legal regulation, the legislature specifies the open-ended 
guarantee ‘P has the right to x’ and, in so doing, gives content to the jural structure 
of the right. Without such specification, the right relates to no class of persons P 
and no class of persons Q and no circumstances in which P and Q are in a 
relationship with respect to P’s or Q’s specific act-description. Without 
legislation,24 there simply is no relationship in law expressing P’s right and Q’s 
correlative duty, P’s privilege and Q’s no-right, P’s power and Q’s liability, or P’s 
immunity and Q’s disability (no-power), all specified to hold (and not) in defined 
circumstances. 
Legislation, thus understood, does not affront the bill of rights. It completes 
it. And in so doing, it gives the various rights and freedoms affirmed in a bill of 
rights legal life – it constitutes these rights and freedoms by limiting their scope 
and content in such a way as to harmonise them one with the other given the vast 
multitude of persons who will claim rights and be under duties, will be empowered 
to change legal relations and liable to those changes, or will be disabled from so 
doing and immune from attempts at such changes. Legislation does no more and 
no less than take the abstracted and reified affirmations of rights in a bill of rights 
and render them apt and cognisable in law by specifying their scope and content.25 
When asked to advise on whether the legal subject can undertake this or that 
activity in the name of ‘the right to x’ under the bill of rights, counsel will look, 
primarily though not exclusively, to legislation and not to a bill of rights. In so doing, 
counsel will search out, in legislation, the various attempts by the legislature to set 
out algorithms for answering the range of questions legal subjects and officials will 
seek to answer in relation to bills of rights. These legislatively prescribed ‘answers’ 
constitute the right as they complete the open-ended guarantee within the bill of 
rights. They seek to provide for the techne of legal reasoning even in this most non-
technical aspect of law. 
 
*   *   * 
 
The underdetermined feature of bills of rights raises a challenge to the rule of law. 
That challenge is answered, in great measure, by reading bills of rights as but the 
beginning rather than the end of the law-maker’s undertaking to set out, in law, 
the scope and content of various rights and freedoms. By signalling via limitation 
                                                     
24 As supplemented and supported by courts developing the common law (and also by executive 
regulations mandated by legislation and prerogative). The primary function of courts as law-applying 
institutions renders problematic, for the rule of law reasons reviewed above, its secondary function of 
law-maker. 
25 See further Webber, n 13 above, ch 4. An excellent review of related issues for moral rights is found in 
J. Oberdiek, ‘Specifying Rights Out of Necessity’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 127. 
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clauses that the specification of ‘P has the right to x’ is only partially and minimally 
undertaken by the bill of rights itself, bills of rights delegate to subsequent law-
makers the task of completing open-ended rights into specified relationships apt 
to guide legal subjects concerned to determine their rights and duties, privileges 
and no-rights, powers and liabilities, and immunities and disabilities. Legal officials 
concerned to reason according to law may now do so: whilst the bill of rights fails 
to provide them with bright lines, it directs them to legislation that does. 
 
 
 
LAW-APPLYING AND BILLS OF RIGHTS 
 
How do law-applying institutions – primarily courts – undertake the task of 
applying bills of rights? One here confronts a well-known, but nevertheless 
counterintuitive, aspect of judicial review under bills of rights: judges are asked to 
determine whether legislation specifying the scope and content of open-ended 
rights conforms with open-ended rights. To those familiar with the work of courts 
reviewing legislation for compliance with bills of rights, this reality is likely not 
appreciated as counterintuitive, although it should readily be seen to be the case 
when divorced from this special context. After all, among the familiar tools of 
legal reasoning is the maxim lex specialis derogat generali, which would give legal 
subjects reason to conclude that legislation specifying the open-ended stipulation 
‘P has the right to x’ cannot thereafter be made subject (and subordinate) to that 
more general formulation. Nevertheless, legislation is said to be subject to bills of 
rights, no doubt because bills of rights of whatever rank (legislative, constitutional, 
international) often affirm themselves to be (and, in any event, are often taken to 
be) part of the ‘supreme law’ of a legal system and therefore superior in legal status 
to legislation, even as legislation seeks to complete the rights left open and 
underspecified by the bill of rights itself. 
As a result, judges confront questions like the following: are legislative 
regulations respecting holocaust denial, pornography, libel, and the range of other 
expression-related, but disputed claims of expression consistent with or in 
violation of freedom of expression? Of course, the various legislative regulations 
seek precisely to answer that question and to do so in a manner that allows legal 
subjects and legal officials to be guided by law’s familiar distinctive devices. 
However, for the judge confronting the question of the law’s compliance with the 
bill of rights, claimants will appeal (and ask the judge to appeal) to the guarantee of 
freedom of expression itself, unmediated by legislation, to determine the 
lawfulness of these regulations.  
Now, it should not be forgotten that limitation clauses themselves can be 
read as inviting some form of judicial review. The question contemplated by a 
limitation clause is rather precise and formulated as follows: is the legal exclusion 
(by criminalisation) of hate propaganda a specification of freedom of expression 
that is demonstrably justifiable in a free and democracy society? Of course, that 
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question, too, has been answered by the legislature: the enactment of legislation 
itself stands as an affirmation that the law-maker considers its regulations to be 
justifiable in a free and democratic society. Indeed, as highlighted above, the 
legislature constructs a society as free and democratic by specifying rights, such 
that the standard of a free and democratic society can only problematically (and, 
thus, with great care) be held out as a standard against which to evaluate such 
specifications. Just how a judge should approach the question of justifiability is far 
from obvious – the limitation clause provides little guidance. If a limitation clause 
can be read to provide any guidance at all, it is rather closer to the mode of judicial 
review contemplated by James Bradley Thayer so long ago: policing the 
boundaries of the demonstrably unjustified in a free and democratic society.26 
This, too, of course belies the techne of legal reasoning. 
Although that is how the bill of rights can be understood to construct the 
relationship between rights and legislation, that is not how the relationship is 
contemplated in so much of European and Commonwealth case law and 
scholarship concerning bills of rights. Rather, the judge tasked with reviewing the 
lawfulness of legislation specifying ‘P has the right to x’ is asked to confront (and 
resolve) whether legislation specifying ‘P has the right to x’ is consistent with the 
unspecified guarantee ‘P has the right to x’. Yet, because the stipulation in the bill 
of rights itself contains no determinate answers to the legislation’s lawfulness – in 
truth, the stipulation ‘P has the right to x’ contains far too many possible answers 
given the decision to maintain disputed claims of rights as within the range of 
possible specifications – the judge is left unable to appeal to the familiar devices of 
legal reasoning to resolve this ostensibly legal question. How, then, have judges 
resolved to administer bills of rights?  
 
JUDICIAL REASONING UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS  
 
Almost without exception, courts (aided by scholars) have adhered faithfully to 
what may be called the received approach to the limitation of rights.27 This approach 
adopts the view that ‘P has the right to x’ stands, in law, for no less than the all-
encompassing and limitless right of P to each and every activity related to x-ing 
which, in turn, resists all legislative attempts to specify the jural structures of the 
right into relationships with Q that hold (and not) in specified circumstances. Thus, 
according to judicial reasoning under the received approach, ‘P has the right to x’ 
is best understood to encompass all possible instances (specific act-descriptions) 
of x and to resist, in the name of one’s right, all possible regulation denying some 
or qualifying other instances of x with time, place, and manner requirements. In 
this way, the received approach transforms an open-ended and underdetermined 
                                                     
26 For a fuller discussion of this view and of the kind of judicial review contemplated by limitation 
clauses, see Webber, n 13 above, ch 6. 
27 See ibid, ch 2. 
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guarantee of a yet-to-be-specified right into an all-encompassing general right to 
everything, anytime, everywhere. No reasonable law-maker would seek to adopt a 
bill of rights with such a radically deficient understanding of the scope and content 
of rights. 
By way of illustration, consider the guarantee ‘Everyone has freedom of 
expression’. The received approach does not take this guarantee as an 
underspecified right in need of further specification so as to resolve debates 
whether pornography, hate speech, and libel are instances of expression within or 
without the scope and content of free expression. Rather, judicial reasoning under 
the received approach takes the guarantee as settling the scope and content of the 
freedom: all instances of expression are within and all possible modes of 
regulation are without. As a result, all legislation specifying which among the 
possible moral meanings and which among the possible legal meanings should 
obtain in law run afoul the bill of rights.  
Judicial reasoning under a bill of rights therefore declines to appreciate ‘P has 
the right to x’ as in need of further specification and, in so doing, introduces to 
law a ‘species’ of right more or less heretofore unknown to legal systems and 
reasoning: a right without jural structure (no correlative duty, no qualifying 
circumstances, no defined class of right-holders or duty-holders, and so on). 
Instead of understanding a two-term right – ‘P has a right to x’ – as a placeholder 
for various specified relationships between P and Q under defined circumstances 
that are yet to be spelled out, the received approach takes the placeholder as 
setting out the specification of the right itself. In so doing, judicial reasoning 
introduces a species of right that is silent respecting the duties of others (including 
the duties of legal officials) and the circumstances in which the right can be 
claimed (and duties compelled), which is taken to signify that the right applies in 
all circumstances. The resulting view favoured by judicial reasoning under bills of 
rights has been that rights extend everywhere, that there is hardly any instance of 
human conduct that cannot find a corresponding ‘x’ in the bill of rights and that, 
in turn, almost every instance of legal regulation runs afoul one or more 
guaranteed rights. Stated otherwise: near all legal regulation becomes a candidate 
for review by judges for compliance with the open-ended rights of the bill of 
rights. 
Legislation ‘limiting’ the scope and content of ‘P has a right to x’ is taken to 
‘infringe’ or ‘violate’ the right. For this reason, limitation clauses are looked upon 
with suspicion and regret within judicial reasoning – they are seen to contemplate 
the possibility that legislation infringing otherwise expansive rights may be upheld, 
despite the infringement, as lawful. For some, limitation clauses signify exceptions to 
otherwise expansive rights,28 for others they represent ‘political compromises’ that 
burden rights with ‘important qualifications’.29 Limitation clauses ‘claw back’ the 
                                                     
28 See eg S. Greer, The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 1999). 
29 R. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton: Princeton 
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otherwise generous scope and content of (limitless) rights by allowing the 
legislature’s infringement of a right to be ‘saved’ or ‘defended’ in the pursuit of 
some justifiable end in a free and democratic society, such as national security, 
public health, or morals. As a result, courts which favour an exaggerated reading 
of rights have come to require a ‘high’ burden of justification before infringing 
legislation can be upheld. According to the logic of judicial reasoning under bills 
of rights, any limitation clause ‘inquiry must be premised on an understanding that 
the impugned limit violates [...] rights’.30 The court therefore positions itself as the 
defender and protector of rights (think ‘forum of principle’) and positions the 
legislature as the antagonist of rights (think ‘forum of policy’), subject to the 
forum of principle evaluating the justification of a right’s violation pursued in the 
name of policy. 
Although limitation clauses provide little direction on the mode of 
justification for a right’s infringement or violation, judicial reasoning has settled on 
the regulative ideas of proportionality and balancing to guide the process of 
justification.31 This overlap in judicial reasoning under bills of rights across 
jurisdictions in Europe, the Commonwealth, and beyond is surprising not only 
because the possibilities for justification in practical reasoning are many, but also 
because limitation clauses make no obvious appeal to these regulative ideas. And 
yet, despite some disagreement and differences in formulation across jurisdictions, 
most courts have settled on the following four components of the principle of 
proportionality to evaluate the justification of legislation’s infringement with ‘P has 
the right to x’: first, the public interest pursued by the impugned legislation must 
be of sufficient importance to justify infringing the right; second, the legislative 
means in service of the public interest should be rationally connected to that 
principle (suitability); third, among the range of possible means pursuing the 
public interest, the impugned means should be the least restrictive (necessity); and 
fourth, the degree of interference with the right should be outweighed by the 
importance of satisfying the public interest (balancing).  
 
STRUCTURE AND MORAL-POLITICAL REASONING 
 
Beyond repeating the four stages of the principle of proportionality, judicial 
reasoning from one case to the next (and, less importantly, from one jurisdiction 
to the next) is less predictable. Insofar as David Beatty’s reconstruction of the case 
law from various jurisdictions is accurate,32 the judicial inquiry under the principle 
                                                     
30 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 [63] (Supreme Court of Canada). 
31 See generally R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and D. 
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). For a critical overview of both 
accounts, see G.C.N. Webber ‘Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights 
Scholarship’ (2010) XXIII Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 179. 
32 And there is reason to doubt it is: see R.A. Posner, ‘Review Article: Constitutional Law From a 
Pragmatic Perspective’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 299. 
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of proportionality is fact-specific and delegates to the parties before the court all 
substantive evaluation. The judicial inquiry is said to be ‘an empirical one of 
establishing whether there are better policy alternatives than the law the 
government chose to enact’.33 By emphasising empirical evidence and the parties’ 
own understandings of the significance of the law for them, the principle of 
proportionality is factual and does not (according to Beatty) require evaluation: the 
facts speak for themselves and the judge will ‘know just by looking, just by sight’ 
which answer (the claim of right succeeds or not) is correct.34  
In turn, if one follows Robert Alexy’s reconstruction of the case law of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, the most important stage of the 
proportionality analysis – balancing – is not fact-specific; indeed, it cannot be. It 
invites judges to engage in ‘value-judgments’, leaving the principle of 
proportionality ‘open in respect of morality’.35 Proportionality and balancing, on 
this understanding, are reflective of the ‘structural richness of reasoning about 
political morality’.36 From this, some take proportionality to be no more and no 
less than a gateway to an ‘exercise of general practical reasoning’ and ‘rational 
policy assessment’.37 In short, judicial reasoning is directed towards determining 
whether legislation, all things considered, is ‘reasonable’ and strikes a ‘fair balance’. 
These different understandings of the principle of proportionality play 
themselves out in the case law. In this respect, scholars struggling with 
reconstructing case law cannot too quickly be dismissed as passing off their 
preferred prescriptions under the cover of description, although it may be said that 
Beatty and Alexy (among others) choose to emphasise some and de-emphasise 
other aspects of the case law (as must all reconstructive accounts). Indeed, judicial 
reasoning under the principle of proportionality reveals a range of different 
approaches; ‘the principle of proportionality’ conceals a range of proportionalities.  
At times, judicial reasoning looks to the particulars of the claimant and 
questions whether it is justified that this claimant’s right is infringed. At other times, 
judicial reasoning takes the claimant as representative of a class and questions 
whether it is justified that the rights of this class of persons are infringed. And again, 
judicial reasoning oscillates, from one case to the next, in just how generously to 
formulate the class to which the claimant belongs. Take, for example, a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada respecting the legal requirement that 
one be photographed to obtain a driver’s license.38 Having concluded that the 
requirement infringed the claimants’ right to religious freedom (the court accepted 
the claim that the claimants’ religious beliefs prevented them from being 
photographed), the principle of proportionality allowed for any of the following 
                                                     
33 Beatty, n 31 above, 92. 
34 ibid, 92, 172, 184, 73. 
35 Alexy, n 31 above, 365-366. 
36 M. Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
Proportionality Requirement’ in G. Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert 
Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 133. 
37 ibid, 140. 
38 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009] 2 SCR 567. 
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three (if not more) approaches. The court could have asked whether the legal 
requirement, as applied to the claimants before the court, was justified in light of 
the legislative objective of maintaining a digital databank of facial photos to reduce 
identity theft and related ends. In turn, the court could have asked whether the 
legal requirement, as applied to the claimants qua representatives of all members of 
this (and similarly situated) religion(s) was justified. Or again, the court could have 
queried the justification by taking the claimants as representative of all members of 
the legal community as a whole (religiously affected and not). Depending on the 
approach taken, the court could be tasking itself with determining whether the 
claimant (taken alone or as a member of a small class of persons) should be exempt 
from the scheme or with discerning whether there exists an alternative (‘fairer’, 
‘more reasonable’) scheme for the claimants and all other members of the legal 
community.39 
The variety of approaches to judicial reasoning under the principle of 
proportionality extends further still. In addition to the range of questions the court 
may ask itself in identifying the so-called competing interests between claimant 
and government, it may rely on different sources of reasons to seek out answers to 
those questions. At times, a court seeks to answer its own questions; at other times 
it asks the defender of the legislative scheme (usually government counsel) to do 
so. By adopting the latter pose, a court is sometimes said to engage in some form 
of ‘Socratic contestation’.40 Socrates, in challenging the positions held by his 
interlocutor, sought out and challenged his interlocutor’s reasons, in a series of 
exchanges. The court, on this model, at times appears to attempt as much, calling 
upon the government to carry the burden of argumentation for the infringing 
legislative scheme (even though Parliament, not the government, adopted the 
scheme). At other times, however, the court is more ambitious and can be taken to 
search out whether good reasons can be found to support the government’s position 
(even if those reasons are not held by the government or Parliament now or at the 
time the scheme was adopted).  
Beyond these different modalities of judicial reasoning under the principle of 
proportionality, one could add variances in how concretely or abstractly the court 
identifies the claimant’s claim of right (is it religious freedom simpliciter, or the 
religious freedom from being photographed, or from being photographed for a 
driver’s license, and so on), how concretely or abstractly the court identifies the 
public interest pursued by legislation (is it deterring crime, creating a database of 
facial photos to assist in deterring crime, collecting as many photos as there are 
                                                     
39 The somewhat dated debates in U.S. journals exploring the indeterminacy of balancing along these 
lines remain ever so pertinent today: see eg T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’ 
(1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 943; H. Black, ‘The Bill of Rights’ (1960) 35 NYU Law Review 865; L.B. Frantz, 
‘The First Amendment in the Balance’ (1962) 71 Yale Law Journal 1424; P.W. Kahn, ‘The Court, the 
Community and the Judicial Balance’ (1987) 97 Yale Law Journal 1; F.M. Coffin, ‘Judicial Balancing: The 
Protean Scales of Justice’ (1988) 63 NYU Law Review 16. 
40 M. Kumm, ‘Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, 
Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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licensed drivers, collecting photos of the claimants before the court), whether the 
claimant is taken to represent a class of potential claimants or not, how ‘weight’ is 
assigned to competing interests in the circumstances of the case, how ‘weight’ is 
assigned to the interests ‘in the abstract’, whether to identify some greater number 
of conflicting interests beyond two (as though legislation ever rests on so simple a 
challenge as two competing interests), and so on for the full range of 
considerations animating balancing. 
The important point to retain here is that judicial reasoning under the 
principle of proportionality, despite the emphasis on the constraints provided by the structure 
of proportionality’s four stages, reveals the full range and richness of practical 
reasoning. No one path is obviously wrong under the principle of proportionality, 
precisely because the principle of proportionality is open with respect to various 
paths. It is perhaps relying on this very flexibility that some affirm without 
embarrassment that moral reasoning under the principle of proportionality is 
‘unavoidable’41 because there is ‘no other rational way in which the reason for the 
limitation can be put in relation to the [...] right’.42 If the principle of 
proportionality stands for nothing short of ‘reasoning’, then indeed it is 
unavoidable: judges can do none other than reason when asked to rule on the 
justification of legislation infringing the bill of rights.43 However, the reasoning 
expected of judges under the principle of proportionality is not the reasoning 
expected of a law-applying official. 
 
THE ABSENCE OF LEGAL REASONING’S TECHNE 
 
The reasoning employed by judges under the principle of proportionality does not 
(because it cannot) appeal to the techne of legal reasoning. Reasoning according to 
underdetermined formulations of the kind ‘P has the right to x’ and according to 
the open-ended principle of proportionality is unable to rely on the usual tools and 
reference points of legal reasoning. Two judges, tasked with the same evaluation 
under the principle of proportionality, cannot be predicted to arrive at the same 
conclusion. No doubt, some will contend the same to be true of much legal 
reasoning,44 but whatever limited force this claim has in general, matters are plainly 
worse for the sort of general moral-political reasoning expected of judges under 
the principle of proportionality. What is more, whereas legal reasoning aspires that 
two judges tasked with the same legal question arrive at the same legal answer, the 
same cannot be said of the aspiration of general moral-political reasoning. After 
all, the task of the law is to render the difficult moral-political questions 
confronting the community easy questions under law. Legal reasoning relies on 
law’s artificial commensuration of the incommensurable. 
                                                     
41 Alexy, n 31 above, 82. 
42 ibid, 74. 
43 I leave aside abdications of the responsibilities of judicial office, like flipping a coin. 
44 For an overview and reply to this objection, see J. Finnis ‘On the “Critical Legal Studies Movement”’ 
(1985) 30 American Journal of Jurisprudence 21. 
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Consider whether the impartiality and fairness of the techne of legal reasoning 
is possible with judicial reasoning under the principle of proportionality. The 
open-ended process of judicial reasoning favoured by proportionality and 
balancing confronts countless choices between rationally appealing but unranked 
alternatives in each and every case (tempered, if at all, only by a commitment to 
follow precedent from one case to the next). The consequence: judicial decisions 
must be ‘genuinely creative’ in much the same way that the decisions of law-
makers must be. Judicial decisions under the received approach to bills of rights 
cannot be ‘the product of anything that was already “there”’45 – neither the 
underdeterminate legal stipulations of rights nor the open-ended stages of 
proportionality and balancing commensurate the incommensurable and render 
difficult questions easy questions under law. Judicial choice is required to settle 
what, under law, should obtain. Prior to that choice, judges can rely on nothing as 
having already settled what, legally, should obtain. But note: this choice is being 
undertaken not in advance of a legal subject’s interaction with a legal official, but 
at the very moment the legal subject is before the legal official. 
The absence of anything already there determinative of choice (anything there 
to eliminate alternative options as reasonable and thus as live candidates for 
choice) and the availability of multiple creative choices are common (because 
necessary) features of law-making institutions; institutions devoted to determining 
what the law shall be in advance of its authoritative application. Because of this 
potentiality, the rule of law aspires that this open-endedness be absent so far as 
possible from law-applying institutions. The latter should seek to further the 
guidance offered by law-making institutions by appealing to law’s ability to 
eliminate in legal reasoning the choices that confront moral-political reasoning. 
This commitment is absent from judicial reasoning under the received approach to 
bills of rights; indeed, as one of proportionality’s proponents puts it, the ‘exercise 
of general practical reasoning’ favoured by proportionality and balancing proceeds 
‘without many of the constraining features that characterize legal reasoning’.46 The 
received approach asks legal officials (judges) to undertake the law-maker’s task of 
determining what, legally, ought to obtain rather than the law-applying official’s 
task of applying what, legally, already obtains. 
The judge engaging in general moral-political reasoning under a bill of rights 
confronts situations (few in number) where reason provides the only answer but 
the central case is otherwise: reason will exclude some options as ‘beyond the pale’ 
but otherwise will take one only so far. The conscientious judge will discover that 
reason supports multiple alternatives; after all, ‘P has a right to x’ has hundreds if 
not thousands of possible moral and legal meanings. Moreover, the conscientious 
                                                     
45 J. Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 138.  
46 M. Kumm, ‘Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice’ 
(2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, 582. See further J. Waldron, ‘Judges as Moral 
Reasoners’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 2 and W. Sadurski, ‘Rights and Moral 
Reasoning: An Unstated Assumption’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 25. 
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judge will discover that the choice between these rationally supported alternatives 
will not be determined by reason. Reason will rank some possible meanings 
relative to others as better or worse, but will be unable to do so for all. Reason will 
do no more and no less than ‘hold the ring, disqualifying countless “solutions” as 
contrary to reason and wrong, but identifying none as uniquely right’.47 By contrast, 
the techne of legal reasoning aspires to allow all legal questions to be reasoned 
through to a uniquely right legal answer. 
The commensuration by law of incommensurables in moral-political 
reasoning reveals the moral-political choice – choice guided but not determined by 
practical reasoning – necessary for the making of law. Incomplete 
commensurability obtains in ‘the absence of any rationally identified metric for 
measuring, or scale for “weighing”, the goods and bads in issue’.48 Such a metric is 
possible where:  
 
(1) goals are well-defined, (2) costs can be compared by references to some 
definite unit of value (for example, money), (3) benefits too can be quantified 
in a way that renders them commensurable with one another, and (4) 
differences among the means, other than their measurable costs, measurable 
benefits, and other aspects of their respective efficiency as means, are not 
counted as significant [...]49  
 
These conditions apply especially in the technical domain, but not in moral-
political reasoning.50 If they did, ‘morally significant choice would be unnecessary 
and [...] impossible [given that] one option could be shown to be the best on a 
single scale which, as all aggregative reasoning does, ranks options in a single, 
transitive order’.51  
Law seeks to provide that order, such that legal reasoning can rely on it. 
However, in the absence of such direction afforded by law, ‘the instruction to 
balance (or, earlier, to weigh) can legitimately mean no more than “Bear in mind, 
conscientiously, all the relevant factors, and choose.” Or, in the legal sphere, “Hear 
the arguments, sitting in the highest court, and then vote.”’52 In this important way, 
proportionality and balancing do not avoid the challenges of incomplete 
commensurability. Whilst it is true that the appeal to balancing trades on 
‘connotations of quantity and precision’,53 no amount of talk of weight, interests, 
or value employed in judicial reasoning can deny the creative choice that confronts 
the judge attempting to determine whether legislation seeking to specify the open-
                                                     
47 J. Finnis, ‘Commensuration and Public Reason’ in R. Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incompatibility, and 
Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 232. 
48 Finnis, n 7 above, 146. 
49 Finnis, n 47 above, 219. See also Finnis, note 7 above, 146. 
50 Finnis, n 47 above, 219; n 7 above, 146. 
51 Finnis, n 7 above, 146. 
52 ibid, 145. Finnis here discusses Dworkin’s instruction to judges to ‘balance’ between ‘fit’ and 
‘justification’ in coming to legal conclusions in hard (and other) cases. 
53 J. Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191. T.A. 
Aleinikoff reviews a range of different uses of the ‘balancing metaphor’ in n 39 above, 975-976. 
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ended guarantee ‘P has the right to x’ is consistent, because ‘proportional’, with 
that very open-ended guarantee. As a result, judges must rely, by necessity and as 
bounded only by the requirements of reason and conscientious decision-making, 
on their own sense of right and wrong.54 
When analysed closely, the received approach to bills of rights ‘fully exposes 
judges as lawmakers’.55 To avoid the impression that judicial appeals to moral-
political reasoning rest, as they must, on the person assuming judicial office, judges 
have appealed, from time to time, to the ‘social science-like methodology’ of 
looking for values ‘out there’, suggesting that moral-political reasoning is, for the 
judge, ‘primarily descriptive’.56 The emphasis on empirical evidence provides a 
‘could-not-have-been-otherwise’ gloss on the result, even as majority and dissenting 
judges argue between themselves that matters really could-not-be-otherwise than 
as they see them. 
 
*   *   * 
 
By the law-making act of choosing between incompletely commensurable 
alternatives, the law is partly ‘self-constitutive’.57 The choice between alternative 
options establishes an (albeit contingent) answer for the chooser and those on 
behalf of whom the choice is made. In legislating in this reasonable way rather 
than that, the law-maker constitutes not only the specification of the right, but also 
the free and democratic society in which the law is authoritative. When legal 
officials then confront that ‘choice’ again, it becomes obvious which reasonable 
alternative should be favoured because a commensuration in law has been 
established by the law-maker. The legal official may then appeal to second-order 
reasons – reasons relying on the choice already made – and conclude that the 
community is no longer confronted with a choice: a legal answer, determined via 
legal reasoning, is at hand. 
This demarcation between law-making and law-applying institutions and 
officials is foreign to the received approach to bills of rights, as is the conception 
of legal reasoning on which the demarcation rests. Judicial reasoning under the 
received approach is not legal reasoning of the familiar kind. It is, rather, the open 
moral-political reasoning of the law-maker. 
 
                                                     
54 On this point, see J. Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, 6: 
‘Most conceptions of this [rule of law] ideal, however, give central place to a requirement that people in 
positions of authority should exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, 
rather than on the basis of their own [...] sense of right and wrong.’ See further R. Ekins, ‘Legislative 
Supremacy and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 127, 147-150. 
55 A. Stone Sweet and J. Matthews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, 77, 88. See also Aleinikoff, n 39 above, 962-963, 973. 
56 Aleinikoff, ibid, 962-963 (see also 993). See further M. Antaki, ‘The Turn to “Values” in Canadian 
Constitutional Law’ in L.B. Tremblay and G.C.N. Webber (eds), The Limitation of Charter Rights: Critical 
Essays on R v Oakes (Montreal: Thémis, 2009). 
57 Finnis, n 47 above, 220. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Two different readings of bills of rights have been explored. Both take the 
underdeterminacy of ‘P has a right to x’ as a starting premise. Under the received 
approach to judicial reasoning under bills of rights, this starting premise is also a 
conclusion to the scope and content of the rights, subject to open-ended judicial 
evaluations of the proportionality between legislation infringing the general right 
and the importance of the general right being infringed. In so doing, the judge’s 
role under a bill of rights is not to pursue an ‘interpretive enterprise’ guided by 
legal reasoning but rather to pursue ‘a general discussion of the reasonableness of 
government conduct’ guided by moral-political reasoning.58 
A different reading of bills of rights is on offer. This reading takes bills of 
rights as setting out only preliminary statements of rights, statements subject to 
subsequent refinement and specification; on this understanding, a bill of rights 
stands as a promise of law, not as a statement of law. The legislature is a necessary 
actor in the implementation and actualisation of a bill of rights; it undertakes the 
difficult, contested, and contingent task of determining which contested claims of 
rights are within and without the scope and content of rights. Legislation does so 
by taking up the deliberative process left open at the time the bill of rights was 
adopted and by seeking to answer, in law and in advance of the bill of rights’ 
authoritative application to legal subjects, questions surrounding which among the 
hundreds and thousands of possible moral and legal meanings should obtain for 
the legal community. The aim of legislation is to assist legal officials – including 
judges – by rendering these hard questions into easy questions under law. 
In so doing, the legislature seeks to maintain the rule of law’s concern to 
demarcate the activities of law-making and law-applying institutions and officials. 
The legislature is friend not foe of the rule of law; it is an institution that furthers 
rather than obstructs the various desiderata of the rule of law. And, despite the 
received approach’s presumption that the legislature is the antagonist of rights, 
legislation establishes the determinacy of relationships between persons which all 
legal rights require to guide legal subjects. 
The demarcation pondered by the rule of law between law-makers and law-
applying officials is founded on a concern for the rights of legal subjects, including 
the self-direction, autonomy, and respect for agency which so many bills of rights 
contemplate. This respect is furthered, not obstructed, by seeking from judicial 
officers that they administer justice according to law by appealing to the tools of legal 
reasoning made available to them by the law-maker. The law-maker seeks, via the 
law’s distinctive devices, to assist legal subjects to identify legal answers even 
where moral-political answers remain elusive or open-ended. The importance of 
this aim is not qualified when seeking to set out which rights and freedoms obtain 
in the community; that is, in setting out which relationships of claim and duty, 
privilege and no-right, power and liability, and immunity and disability (no-power) 
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obtain between persons and in what circumstances. After all, ‘legal thinking (i.e. 
the law) brings what precision and predictability it can into the order of human 
interaction by a special technique: the treating of (usually datable) past acts [...] as 
giving, now, sufficient and exclusionary reason for acting in a way then “provided 
for”.’59  
To ask judges to do otherwise is unavoidable at times, but to expect that the 
legislature does not seek to allow legal officials to rely on this special technique is 
to give insufficient concern to the rule of law. It is also to give insufficient concern 
to the respect for the rights of legal subjects that the rule of law contemplates 
when promoting the techne of legal reasoning so absent from judicial reasoning 
under bills of rights. 
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